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Belief, and Magic* DAVID C. TAYLOR â€oe¿ We cannot command nature except by obeying herâ€• (Bacon)
First, four stories in crescendo.
(a) A courageous OP refers a boy aged eight who has â€˜¿ gone off his legs' that morning. The OP says he knows it is hysterical but that he cannot stop it. The boy is brought by car. A kind psychiatrist negotiates through the window the need for the boy to mount the steps to come and talk. The boy comes. He talks about how his estranged father had promised first a trip to the cup final and then to the replay and had twicelet him down. The anger, love,disappointment, and the humiliation in front of his friends took his legs from under him, turned him weak at the knees, turned his legs to jelly. He walked out of the consultation and remained well. (b) A 14-year-old boy has a fixed flexion deformity of the right hand. Sudek's atrophy is beginning. The psychiatrist is the 11th sort of specialist to be consulted. A sudden painful inexplicable bruise on the back of the hand has been casually dealt with by a locum OP; after a sleepless night the mother and child waited in casualty for hours, finally to be told that spontaneous bruises were not treated there. The casualty department of an orthopaedic hospital, however, provided a plaster, an appointment to review in two days' time, then admitted him because of pain in plaster, an admission which had lasted for eightweeksbeforethe psychiatristwascalled.Several persuasive chats and devices were needed before the hand was able to recover fully. (c) A very mature 13-year-old girl has twice been admitted for abdominal pain. Following the removal of a normal appendix, anaesthesia develops round the wound and gradually spreads. When encouraged to be upstanding she shows marked astasia abasia.
The psychiatrist is called synchronously with a surgeon who, â€oe¿ not going to be caught outâ€•,orders a myelogram and a scintillation scan. The family meeting is angrily supportive of the child's right to be ill. The mother works in the medical field, the father is affable but largely absent on business and is said to havea chronicillness,a brother is describedas having had an accident in which â€oe¿ he left most of his blood in the road but was otherwise alrightâ€•,and another brother's school and university careers were ruined by â€˜¿ lymphoma', which turned out to be spastic colon. Over the ensuing years, despite treatment, the girl works her way through a variety of illnesses including one from which she emerges with the sort of scar she might otherwise have derived from wrist slashing.
(d) A girl of nine vomited her lunch when her sister and boyfriend started to punch one another. The fighting stopped and she was â€oe¿ rushed to hospitalâ€•.Later, a recurrence of vomiting led to another admission and then one lasting six weeks, needing intravenous fluids.
The psychiatrist met her gently mewing into the steel bowl provided. Her trick of deliberate vomiting con tinued inexorably. Her mother had died of an overdose of drugs and alcohol, her father was a recidivist gaol bird. Both her brothers wereingaol for seriousoffences.
No negotiation with her about her facility to vomit proved possible over 18months in psychiatric care nor during a subsequent stay at another hospital. There she suffered a rupture of the oesophagus from the stomach and, following a heroic repair, she requested orange juice by mouth. When refused this she made to vomit, reopened her wound, and bled to death.
A number of young people are being presented to doctors with sicknesses of great morbidity and occasional mortality, which ape illnesses or suggest serious diseases, but which are attributed either to unknown or to arcane physical processes by the sick person or his supporters. Doctors, acting on their ordinary assumptions about physical illness, exert themselves and may exhaust themselves in their search for aetiology. In the absence of classic signs, pathognomic illness, or conventional pathological changes, the doctors may then attempt to exit from their engagement, reassuring the patient that all is well, despite the apparent sickness. This reassurance may be accepted, but it may be blocked by the patient or family if they are deeply committed to the sickness in its structural sense (Taylor, 1986; Goodyer, 1986) .
Even worse, diagnostic frustration or the physician's personal needs might ensnare him into formulations on which reputation is staked and so are not easily relinquished. While it is unarguable that there are yet undiscovered diseases (Slater, 1965) , it has also been true throughout the recorded history of medicine that people, transiently or chronically, and for a variety of motives, lay claim to physical ailments, impairments and disorders which they do not have, and for which they are prepared at times to manufacture the evidence. As I see it, such people 5Reproduced by permission from Realism and Human Being (ed. Roy Bahskar). Oxford: Basil Blackwell (in press).
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have a belief about how they are, and they are pre pared togo to great lengths to make the world congruent with that belief (Robins & O'Neal, 1953; Maloney, 1980; Flechet eta!, 1983) . In children's medicine it is usual for the beliefs to be held by the family, or some part of it, or by some other system, which can include doctors (Goodyer, 1985; Byng-Hall, 1986) . Doctors who are not caught up in the system have called these sicknesses deceits (Naish, 1979; Bayliss, 1984) or, more dispassionately or compassionately, hysteria. There is nothing unreal or imaginary about these sicknesses, even though they are of the imagination, just as the novel or the play is not imaginary although it was imagined. I shall argue that they are an aspect of a defence mechanism, a mechanism which from one perspective we callhysteria but from another perspective we understand as belief, and from another as magic. The dramas of which I gave examples above are mostly chronic socialised medical versions of the hysterical mechanism, which is normally of very rapid onset and offset. I see these dramas as mobilising reactions every bit as powerful as do the more dramatic situations to which I shall later refer.
Belief I want to draw attention to the fundamental part played in these scenarios by beliefs. Doctors' training is more directed towards what people say and how they act and is too little concerned with what they believe. In a largely godless society, there are few people who experience the power of a benign conviction with which it is easy to empathise. But the mental action of believing, of â€oe¿ accepting propositions as true on the grounds of the testimony of others or on the basis of facts beyond observationâ€• (Oxford Eng!ish Dictionary), while it clearly has survival value, is also subject to abuse. Thus, while it is necessary to have a mental mechanism that allows judgements to be made and action initiated on the basis of incomplete information, such a mechanism does allow false convictions to be arrived at either spontaneously or by the contrivance of others (Taylor, 1987 (Roy, 1982) . However, the characteristics of the victim and the physiology of the disorder may be less crucial to our understanding if we are simply dealing with a medical perspective on an aspect of normal human behaviour, which might be differently interpreted from other perspectives and at other times (Rabkin, 1964; Mayou, 1975; Hurst, 1983) .
In 1961 I was house officer to William Sargant. One Saturday he admitted to our ward a teenagegirl diagnosed schizophrenic on the evidence of her terrifying sensation of being the victim of systematic persecution by â€oe¿ dark forcesâ€•and the fact that an older sister had already been institutionalised for some years, diagnosed with a similar illness. Starting treatment seemed unwise until contact could be made with her parents. Initially, she resisted this, explaining that contact could be made only via inter mediaries. As her terror diminished and her confidence grew, she agreed by late afternoon to initiate the contact. Within an hour I was telephoned by her father. He took the viewthat his daughter had been abducted into hospital by a witches' coven and that he would proceed through public pressure to secureher release. Her fiancÃ© appeared. he was induced, against what he regarded as his better judgement, to reveal to me that the family were extremely secretive because they were in great danger. He instanced hysteria, as that which is being experienced, and hysterics, as those who are experiencing it, has increased the problems in the discourse. Is hysteria something that only hysterics can do? A further problem concerns possible differences between the mechanisms that enable the hysterical response and those that maintain it to a clinical presentation. A conviction might be suddenly arrived at but be abandoned or become incorrigible according to circumstances.
The circumstances include the intrapsychic life.
What constitutes hysteria to different doctors is determined by their personal perspective and by their locus in the health care organisation.
Psychiatrists mostly see and have written about long-established cases, neurologists have been preoccupied with not allowing themselves to be deceived nor yet overlook organ pathology; both have hankered after running the great neurosis to earth in the neurone. Physicians have leant towards seeing hysteria as a moral flaw or a deceit. Paediatricians, well used to deflecting children's and parents' offers of sickness, are nevertheless sporadically overwhelmed by bravura performances, and then sometimes feel so shy they do not like to let on (Creak, 1938; Dubowitz & Hersov, 1976; Goodyer, 1981; Ernst et a!, 1984) .
Almost all doctors, almost all the time, participate in the sexist plot to regard hysteria as a sickness of women, despite the efforts of physicians from as long ago as Briquet and Charcot to the contrary (Owen, 1971) , while largely ignoring the massive issue of war time hysterias.
Very important insights into the probable basis of the hysterical mechanism have come to attention through war-time casualties and through the epidemic hysterias. It is because these occasions recruit so readily from otherwise ordinary human beings that they provide us with a glimpse of possible mechanisms.
The arguments about hysteria will continue until the mechanism is clarified. To separate epidemic and war hysterias from clinical cases is simply to evade the issue, at the expense of learning a useful lesson. The literature on hysteria during and after World War I and II reveals the scale of the problem (Sargant, 1940; Sargant & Slater, 1940 , 1941 . Thousands of men were affected and, while battle casualties were an important core of the group, much of the hysteria was contributed by non-combatants.
Despite an attentive and relatively humane method of dealing with the casualties, they were subsequently largely useless for combat (Slater et a!, 1941 contacted other agencies who revealed to me that he suffered from schizophrenia, so there were only five and not six participants in this (folie) whose beliefs ranged from the delusional through the overvalued to the intense.
The construction we place upon this incident in a psychiatric ward in England, in the late 20th century,
is not of a family bewitched, but of a small confined group, powerfully influenced to believe and act upon the basis of a belief held by a schizophrenic, a man suffering a serious chronic disorder of brain function. The rest were in thrall to the power of his conviction. It is a clinical example, but there are abundant political and religious examples that readily come to mind in the world today, and we have the recent history of madmen like Mr Jones, 900 of whose believers were readily persuaded to a syn chronous suicide in Guyana.
Hysteria
In its most general sense in medicine, hysteria implies laying claim to, or making an avowal of, bodily dysfunction for which the typical causes are not apparent and in a manner that somehow parodies the sorts of distress produced by organ pathology (Head, 1922; Walshe, 1965) . It is dangerous ground for everyone; hysteria might entail pretending by the patient on the one hand, and yet it will also subsume ignorance and error by doctors on the other (Slater, 1965) . It has a long history in medicine, which encourages doctors to believe that it is a disease, tangible in some sense (Flor-Henry eta!, 1981; for Henry, 1985; Guze et a!, 1986) , rather than a description of how things stand between a doctor and his patient, and the patient and his world (Mayou, 1984 Similarly, the war casualties were graded in personality traits, so that groups of men, similar in character to the dogs, could be shown to have behaved similarly under varying degrees of stress. Obviously, invaliding out on psychiatric grounds had to be controlled, and the disparaging language reflects the negative military attitude to the faint of heart. But it suggests too that, for men at least, the option of going transmarginal will be associated with severe loss of esteem whatever the scale of the precipitating event (Sargant, 1973) .
In war men came to accept the proposition that they might well die. Often on the evidence of their own eyes, but also on the testimony of others they had, as soldiers, accepted the possibility of death as a fact beyond observation.
In other words, they came, at varying degrees of remove from the evidence, to believe they might die. The trans marginal inhibition was a defence. Pavlov believed that ultimately every human being had the capacity for it. Ross (1941) â€oe¿ When â€˜¿ La Provence' was torpedoed we were able to study the manifestations of emotion close at hand apart from any commotional state.
We found that the pithiatic(hysterical)phenomenadid not occur until later when the survivors were in safety. Thesephenomenayieldedto an energetictreatmentwhich was immediately applied, and did not recur during the week which followed the accident. Our experiencewas divided into four periods. 1st period. On board the boat seventeen minutes between the explosion and the complete disappearance of the boat â€"¿ period of pure emotion. The crew were anxious and dumb. No cries. Many were in a state of agitation.
Later an officer shot himself through the head.
This was followed by a small epidemic of suicide.
There were however no fits, convulsions or paralyses. In seventeen minutes there was nothing left on the water but wreckage, swimmers and drowned. 2nd period. In the sea for eighteen hours. Seventeen of us clungto a raft during this period. At first there were some expressions of despair but a cheerful fellow pulled them together by saying he had often been in a much worse hold and was sure he would get out this time. One man began a religious lament which began to upset others, but the officer told him if he did not keep quiet he would throw him in the water. None of the the men died.
3rd period. After eighteen hours we were picked up by a torpedo boat and when all were on deck I inspected them. Several now showed neuropathic phenomena: quadraplegia, paraplegia, mutism, snarling, weeping, barking, shaking amounting to spasmodic movements of the upper limbs. I sent them down to the engine-room close to the engine where the temperature was very high. The number of my patients increased as new survivors arrived so that out of six hundred picked up there were about forty showing nervous disturbances.
The treatment was simple. They were stripped naked in an overheated room and energeticallyrubbed by two vigorous sailors with a hair glove soaked in alcohol. As soon as they had been warmed externally and internally with rum, I took each one separately and smacked him harder and harder until the disturbances disappeared, all the time speaking kindly to them and expressing my delight at the rapidity of their recovery. No-one resisted more than ten minutes: many were cured of contagion on witnessing the treatment of the others. The majority expressed to me their gratitude on witnessing the treatment of the others. 4th period. I was able to see my patients for a week and there were no relapses.â€• The report describes the traumatic event leading to pervasive stunned shock or a self-destructive alter native. Then, while peril remains but before rescue, a long period of apparent calm. Then, as seen from a medical perspective, some of the phenomena of relief from trauma and peril. Silent tears, con gratulatory embraces, gales of laughter are not mentioned, only those men whose â€˜¿ symptoms' might have some medical connotation, however, various they may be. It is honest about the aggressive nature of the brainwashing treatment. The difference between these symptoms and clinically presented hysterias is that they were experienced by people from a group known to be well only a while before and there are no supporters of their sick condition. Once these circumstances change, the belief, the hysteria, could take a more chronic hold.
Ross's other contribution is to pote the paradox of how differently the civilian population, who had ostensibly had the cream of their manhood with drawn from them, react to the devastation of civilian bombing, from which they can neither escape nor Sargant, 1957) . This is as near to the moment of the manifestation of the hysterical mechanism as we can get descriptively.
â€oe¿ The terror exhibited.. . is electrifying to watch. The body becomes increasingly tense and rigid; the eyes widen and the pupilsdilate,whilethe skinbecomescoveredwith a fine perspiration. The hands move convulsively....
Breathing becomes incredibly rapid or shallow. The intensity of the emotion sometimesbecomes more than they can bear, and frequently at the height of the reaction, there is collapse and the patient falls back in the bed and remains quiet for a few minutes. . .â€oe Abreaction does not require the reliving of the traumatic event that seemingly precipitated the hysterical symptoms (Shorvon & Sargant, 1947) . Its therapeutic value lies in the intensity of an emotional catharsis. It seems to offer a close approximation to the physiology and psychology of the overwhelming event. Sargant (1957) Now consider the mechanism which enables the hysterical response. What would be the biological and evolutionary value of such a mechanism with instantaneous onset and offset? While the response to threat in human beings through flight or fighting back is amply described in student textbooks of physiology and psychology, little is said about responses to events in which these options are both precluded. What options remain? Consider the condition of stunned shock in the bird or the mouse which the cat has caught. They are close to death and maybe, in stupor or even by self-induced death, at least avoid further pain. But there may be a fine margin of profit in playing possum. Several species feign death to deflect potential predators or mimic injury to draw predators away from helpless young. Even the alternative, the frantic, non-cognitive, headless chicken, â€oe¿ violent motor reactionâ€•, just might secure escape. These two responses were described by Kretschmer (1961) The settings of epidemic hysterias, the trigger events, and the symptoms are important to under standing hysteria (McEvedy et a!, 1966; Moss & McEvedy, 1966; Alexander & Fedoruk, 1986) . So too are the nature, quality, and the stridency of the alternative explanations which are always insisted upon a section of the community (usually relatives of victims) which assist in the pro motion and maintenance of symptoms (Watson, 1982; Small & Borus, 1983) . In these dramas the actors and the audience are equal partners. In this way the medical procedures tend to vali date the sickness to the relatives in the same process which invalidates it to the doctors. Epidemic hysterias arise couched in social settings that enhance emotionality and promote the rapid â€oe¿ mental acceptance of propositions as true even if beyond observationsâ€•. The sorts of events that produce these responses are unavoidable apparent threats that have emerged through some form of ultra rapid group consensus. Removal of the affected individuals from the group normally allows them a rapid return to normality since the so-called threat exists much more as a function of corporate than of personal belief. The parallels in animal behaviour are in the extraordinary rapidity of communication in herd and flock behaviour. A recent epidemic of hysteria on the Israel/Arab border, however, was politically exploited, and by precluding appropriate treatment of young people the epidemic persisted longer and spread wider than usual (Hefez, 1985) .
â€oe¿ Thirty-four students. . . were suddenly afflicted by an attack of blindness, headache anÃ §t stomachache, as well as cyanosis of the.. . limbs. . . . The doctors noticed that two girls had developed complete blindness with respiratory complications and transferred them by ambulance to Affula Central Hospital where they were admitted to the intensive care unit . . .â€oe Within the affected group in the hysterical epidemic there will be some who are at that moment so placed that, for them, the hysteria is psycho logically opportune. This leads to recidivism, as it did in that report, especially if non-symptomatic contacts are keen to exploit the occasion to air their beliefs about aetiology. Currently non-validatable high-technology credos are favoured as bases for these epidemics: viruses, allergens, crop sprays, nuclear fallout, etc. Sadly and tragically, these credos also affect sick children presenting individually whose sicknesses, because they are sporadic, are easily initially misperceived and become even more deeply established as a result of the interventions and investigations required to invalidate medical diagnoses once they have been entertained. In order to make an investigation ethically, the doctor must entertain the same possibility as the complainant, and this reinforces the possibility and it is that which is the important element in the belief. Bronowksi (1978) in his Magic, Science, and Civilization lectures traces the change in our interpretation of nature from magic to science to the period between 1500 and 1700. He defmes magic as â€oe¿ that logic which is separate from the logic everyday life but which,
Magic
given the secret key, could command natureâ€•.Only the initiates would have this power. Of all the situations where people might wish to command nature (such as during drought), sickness, especially in their children, must be the most pervasive and seductive. Since medicine has been largely tech nologically powerless for most of its history, it is not surprising to find its alliance with magic (Precope, 1954; Maple, 1968 Mauss (1950, p. 142) â€oe¿ The magician puts to work collective forces and ideas to help the individual imagination in its beliefâ€•. Magical cures, then, simply reverse the process of hysterical sickness.
The â€˜¿ forces' to which Mauss refers are to my view originally in the individual and derive from primitive animism, that historical, but also, and more persistently, developmental phase to which we variably readily regress, and about which we are variably embarrassed when we do. Primitive animism implies that all objects are imbued with their own spirits which have motives, and their behaviour is regulated by the interaction of these spirits, leaving man a hapless bystander, unless he can command them. It is an almost universal experience, especially when we have been let down by a machine. There is thus ample scope for deceit, conviction, and delusion to comingle and interact in manipulating these moments of distorted conviction. If the magical convictions are powerful enough, man can be persuaded to give up life itself (Beecher, 1962; Milton, 1973; Mauss, 1979 at his mouth. His body begins to tremble and the muscles twist involuntarily. He swaysbackwards and falls to the ground, and after a short time appears to be in a swoon; but soon after he writhes as if in mortal agony, and, covering his face with his hands, begins to moan.â€• (Basedow,1925 , quoted by Cannon, 1942 This description of death through conviction through â€oe¿ pointing of bonesâ€• is compelling similar to the sequence of events in sudden religious conversion, abreaction, war hysteria, and epidemic hysteria, given above. Like the â€oe¿ stunned shockâ€• and â€oe¿ possumâ€• reactions, recovery is immediate if the curse is lifted by the person who imposed it, even when seemingly profound physiological changes have supervened.
More common than such executions are the living deaths or the temporary deaths to which I initially referred. Some of these sicknesses are very long, troublesome and costly; they deserve our attention. They differ from serious diseases by being lived with almost triumphantly, although protestingly, while still maintaining a belief system which conventional medicine does not hold.
In 1985 a 12-year-old boy was referred for a further opinion on management. His parents' view was that he suffered numerous lifelong somatic complaints and, increasingly, behavioural problems which were due to multiple allergies. His allergy to rain had made the national press, but he was also said to be allergic to North Sea gas and a wide variety of other substances, not often thought of as allergens. Initially, he could not be brought into the building where I work because his mother could see that it was the type of building in which potential allergens abound. â€˜¿ Neutralisingdrops', available in phials costing Â£25 each, were used. The touch of these under the tongue instantly enabled him to enter. Nevertheless his â€˜¿ allergic' response was judged by his mother to be evidenced by his terror, horror, or revulsion, experienced from out side, but in man these states can also be accessed from within, as a result of beliefs. Beliefs are generated by information which is accessed from memory in a subjective (emotional) context. Beliefs differ from certain knowledge in that they are generally arrived at on the basis of partial information and can derive from experiential rather than empirical knowledge. This is not necessarily verbally encoded in memory and is hence inaccessible to verbal approaches. This has survival value but allows error. Belief and false belief are thus tied into the third defence mechanism. In groups it is in the nature of belief to be contagious. Magic plays its tricks through the mechanism of belief.
Sickness evokes aspirations to command nature.
In man, through belief, through magic, a mechanism of potentially lethal power can be manipulated. But there are more chronic terrors, more persistent states of being, where neither flight nor fighting back is available. One possible diversion lies in a mechanism which is perceived as sickness, and this at times will be opportune and give rise to lengthy dramas.
Unfortunately, doctors cannot guess at that before they become embroiled in them. But they can beware. pathetic foul-mouthed observation that she might now leave. He was born, nine years after his only sibling, to an elderly mother. Termination was considered. She suffered from high blood pressure and many â€˜¿ allergies' that limited her diet. Her husband was a bizarre man of extraordinary social behaviour who had been subject to psychosis from the age of 21. He was still in regular psychiatric care. He also claimed migraine due to potato allergy. Their implacable belief was that their son exhibited lifelong allergy, as evidenced by his having had episodes of sickness and diarrhoea as a baby, his developing stomach pains, weak feelings, muzzy headedness, and his own parody of aggression from his first days at school. They could no longer afford private allergy treatment. They hoped he could be placed in a â€˜¿ bubble' so that he could recover while protected from the alien world.
The boy, when separated from his parents, was just an obese, dull, unhappy child who reiterated the family beliefs.
The parents initially rejected psychiatric treatment and admission to hospital but reluctantly conformed when the question of school avoidance and its legal consequence was raised. He lived for four months in hospital taking ordinary hospital diet and going swimming with the school. No evidence of any form of â€˜¿ attack' was witnessed except those involving his parents and consisting of childish rudeness and slaps. These were always interpreted by them in terms of reactions to allergens. A consultant paediatrician expert in allergy found only minor traces of evidence, of marginal relevance. Initally, the boy began to settle to the fuller life and improve his impoverished education and social skills. But as pressure to remove him from home more permanently increased, he regressed in his general behaviour, and became firmer in his beliefs about his allergic state. At the same time his father's psychosis decompensated and his mother's beliefs became more fervent and frantic. It became clear that the local authority felt unable to act on behalf of the child on the basis of the available evidence of abuse, and the parents removed the child from hospital. A year later his â€˜¿ unique problem' made the Sunday newspapers. He was pictured at home, indoors on a rainy summer day. He is the real prisoner of their imaginations. Levi-Strauss (1967) recognised these sicknesses now being variously labelled by the technologists: he called them â€oe¿ Piteous sicknesses, the total surrender of existence in a last ditch defence of the self by total capitulation.â€• This capitulation by the organism, often partial, sometimes total, is being hypostatised, made into yet another illness. In hysteria there exists an alternative defence mechanism to fight or flight. It is widespread in animal species. It has an aspect of stupor and an aspect of frantic, mindless activity that is not organised flight.
In animals these mechanisms are accessed through extreme terror, usually in situations that imply potential imminent demise. It is crucial that these physiological defence mechanisms unlock instantly if the situation improves. In man the mechanisms are readily accessed in situations of
